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Protecting Civilians  
and Protecting Ideas 
Institutional Challenges to the  
Protections of Civilians

Executive Summary 
Although the Protection of Civilians (PoC) today is largely embedded 
in the UN system as a whole, there are a number of issues still critical 
to address at the institutional level for the PoC to inform a shared cul-
ture of protection effectively. These include addressing the extent to 
which preparations for civilian protection are an integral component 
of mission planning, and whether protection activities are part of the 
mission’s mandate per se or a mere part of its many tasks. Also of key 
concern is the extent to which operational capacity is achieved and 
designed to enhance protection.  
 
At headquarter level, two main challenges remain. How can PoC be-
come part of a shared interagency culture, rather than remaining the 
sole prerogative or task of UN OCHA without thereby losing its insti-
tutional momentum, and how can UN DPKO take greater ownership 
to PoC without this being prejudicial to the ability of the concept to 
include both military and humanitarian segments of peace operations. 
Finally, as the effective protection of civilians in mission depends not 
only on the UNSC’s ability to adopt new measures aimed at protecting 
civilians, but also on the extent to which these measures are effective 
in protecting vulnerable groups on the ground, there needs to be 
clearer institutional mechanisms for learning from experience. As of 
today, the reporting from the field is largely lost to those drafting reso-
lutions.  
 
The ability of UN missions to protect civilians in peacekeeping opera-
tions will only become fully effective once the UN system manages to 
set in place institutional structures for learning on the basis of the ex-
periences on the ground, and cooperate on PoC on a case-to-case ba-
sis. 
 

1. Introduction 
Since 1999, the Protection of Civilians (PoC) has been gradually 
sought institutionalized as a guiding framework and principle for UN 
peace operations. But in spite of the wide acceptance the principle en-
joys, its application in the field remains unclear and fuzzy (see Lie and 
de Carvalho 2008). Furthermore, while protection issues enjoyed a 
strong momentum at UN headquarters, especially with the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the process 
had recently stagnated, and PoC has been challenged both within and 
outside the United Nations (UN). However, parallel to these chal-
lenges we also see attempts at regaining the momentum PoC once en-
joyed, and at refining and clarifying its conceptual character and 
meaning. 
 
The present report is an attempt at addressing the institutional hin-
drances PoC has met at headquarters, and suggesting ways ahead. The 
little research that has addressed PoC has tended to concentrate on the 
field and on how PoC is implemented in practice, leaving the process 
at headquarters and the institutional challenges PoC meets there unad-
dressed. Thus, we outline some of these challenges and the synchronic 
initiatives to counter and comply with them. Our underlying assump-
tion is that only by understanding the assemblage of challenges and 
new initiatives are we able to embark on transformative acts to miti-
gate problems associated with PoC. 
 
First, however, the report provides a brief outline of PoC’s policy tra-
jectory, institutional realm and content. As will be illustrated, protec-
tion language is increasingly being incorporated into Security Council 
resolutions and when establishing new missions. The main part of this 
report thus focuses on the rationales and instruments pertaining to the 
protection of civilians at UN’s headquarter level. 
 
We go on to discuss the extent to which PoC has become implemented 
at headquarters level, and the extent to which there are measures in 
place to ensure that PoC concerns are not only taken into account 
when mandating new operations, but also when renewing existing 
mandates of Security Council authorised operations. Of crucial con-
cern here is the ability of headquarters to understand the extent to 
which mandated PoC tasks are relevant and effective once imple-
mented in the field. Today, different culture between UN agencies and 
                                                 
The present research was made possible through a grant from the Norwegian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs through the Training for Peace in Africa Programme (TfP). 
Jon Harald Sande Lie and Benjamin de Carvalho 8 
the lack of reporting routines institutionalized at headquarters level 
largely hinder such a learning process. 
1.1 Challenges to the UN’s Protection Agenda 
In the context of UN peace support operations, civilian protection is 
no longer the task of humanitarian agencies alone, as illustrated by the 
recent UN Capstone Doctrine on peacekeeping operations:  
 
In situations of internal armed conflict, civilians account for 
the vast majority of casualties. Many civilians are forcibly up-
rooted within their own countries and have specific vulner-
abilities arising from their displacement. As a result, most 
multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are 
now mandated by the Security Council to protect civilians un-
der imminent threat of physical violence. The protection of ci-
vilians requires concerted and coordinated action among the 
military, police and civilian components of a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation and must be mainstreamed into the 
planning and conduct of its core activities. United Nations hu-
manitarian agencies and non-governmental organization 
(NGO) partners also undertake a broad range of activities in 
support of the protection of civilians. Close coordination with 
these actors is, therefore, essential (UN 2008: 24).  
 
As the UN doctrine emphasizes, the protection imperative requires a 
comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to peacekeeping, but 
also more robust mandates and intentions. Reducing the level of vio-
lence and protecting civilians may require the use of force, no matter 
the mandate of the mission. The use of force to reduce violence is 
what has been termed the ‘the protection paradox.’ This paradox is 
further exacerbated by the intended comprehensiveness of PoC, in that 
it makes the difficult interface between humanitarian and security 
segments necessary. 
 
The UN faces several severe challenges to its protection agenda. The 
most difficult challenge concerns the empirical realities that contrast 
the UN’s vast ambitions. Time and again we witness the UN’s failure 
in protecting civilians in situations of crises and conflicts, as recently 
witnessed by the civilian sufferings in the eastern Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, the detrimental situation of refugees and displaced per-
sons in Chad, and the continuous atrocities taking place in Darfur. 
One side of this inability on behalf of the UN is the moral and ethical 
dilemma, as the UN fails the most vulnerable – those who have en-
trusted the UN the role to protect them become the chief victims of 
UN’s weak enforcement of its own responsibilities. Although writing 
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on the World Bank, Weaver terms this phenomenon – that is, the dis-
connect between theory and practice, mandate and implementation, 
promises and delivery – as the ‘hypocrisy trap’ of multilateral organi-
sations (Weaver 2008). Potential consequences of such hypocrisy are 
the loss of credibility and respect throughout the international com-
munity in general and among donor institutions and the intended bene-
ficiaries in particular, that the UN undermines itself and the very fun-
dament on which the institution rests, and the very raison d’être of the 
overall civilian protection agenda and the UN’s role in contexts call-
ing for civilian protection.  
 
In response to these external challenges, the UN attempts internally to 
refine and improve existing concepts and mechanisms pertaining to 
the protection of civilians, as well as devising new concepts. The Pro-
tection of Civilians (PoC) represents the main established concept for 
dealing with protection concerns, but one should also note the related 
concepts of human security, humanitarian intervention, and the more 
recent Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Lie 2008). ‘Although intellec-
tually related and sometimes overlapping, these ideas have sometimes 
been compounded with protection resulting in confusion and contro-
versy’ (Security Council Report 2008: 4). This study, however, fo-
cuses on PoC and processes internal to the UN’s HQ level that aim to 
improve, enhance, and disseminate PoC throughout UN in order to 
engender a more robust framework for providing civilian protection.  
 
 
 
 
2. Protection of Civilians: A Concep-
tual and Institutional Overview 
The Protection of Civilians (PoC) concept is rooted in International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and maintained by international humanitar-
ian agencies’ subscription to the humanitarian imperative as their bea-
con.1 Within UN, OCHA owns the policy franchise of PoC and serves 
as its conceptual anchor. As a coordinating body of humanitarian ef-
forts OCHA consequently relates to other key UN agencies and non-
UN humanitarian partners organised in the Inter-agency Standing 
Committee (IASC) in their operational activities within the humanitar-
                                                 
1  The humanitarian imperative draws on the first Geneva Convention ‘for the amelioration 
of the conditions of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field’ – first adopted in 
1864 and last revised in 1948. The first convention set the standards for humanitarian 
concerns and how to respond to them, and followed the foundation of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in 1863.  
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ian space.2 The IASC was established in 1992 and operates under the 
coordinated leadership of UN’s Emergency Relief Coordinator 
(ERC).3 As a response to urgent humanitarian needs worldwide fol-
lowing the challenging political dilemma of how to respond to crises 
involving an increased number of civilian casualties as wars became 
less a matter of interstate conflicts and more a struggle between intra-
state parties, the UN in 1998 (UN SG 1998) coined the protection of 
civilians concept to address that ‘[…]the civilian toll relative to the to 
that suffered by combatants in situations of armed conflict [have] in-
creased dramatically, but civilian casualties in conflicts today are in-
creasingly the result of deliberate targeting by fighting parties rather 
than indirect victims’ (Vogt, de Carvalho et al. 2008). Attention was 
put on ‘the extreme levels of suffering for civilians caught up in situa-
tion of armed conflict where the protagonists were demonstrating 
lower and lower levels of respect for IHL norms (Security Council 
Report 2008).4 Notably the experience from Rwanda and Kosovo pro-
pelled rethinking of international and Security Council approaches to 
civilian protection.  
 
The articulation of Protection of Civilians as a separate conceptual 
thematic realm first appeared in 1998. The Secretary-General’s report 
on the situation in Africa was seminal in mentioning the Protection of 
Civilians concept (UN SG 1998), following which the Security Coun-
cil’s resolutions 1265 and 1296 (UN SC 1999; UN SC 2000) were 
adopted. These resolutions reaffirmed the Council’s presidential 
statement that outlined a set of issues that were to become the core of 
PoC (UN SC 1999), namely (i) the need to ensure safety of civilians, 
(ii) ensure compliance with IHL, (iii) address impunity and injustice, 
(iv) the unimpeded access and safety of humanitarian personnel, and 
(v) address the proliferation of small arms and the problems by con-
ventional armaments. 
 
PoC is thus broad in scope and draws on a comprehensive notion of 
security that transcends the mere physical protection. Resolution 1296 
emphasises the need for PoC to ‘proceed on a case-by-case basis’. Al-
though this seemed to signal more intensive attention to PoC by the 
Council, it also reflects growing caution to the norm-setting role of 
PoC (Security Council Report 2008: 7). Nevertheless, PoC has over 
the last decade conveyed increased attention to civilian suffering.  
                                                 
2  The concept ‘humanitarian space’ was originally formulated by Medicine Sans Frontiers’ 
previous leader, Rony Brauman, as ‘a space of freedom in which we are free to evaluate 
needs, free to monitor the distribution of and use of relief goods and have a dialogue with 
the people’.  
3  The ERC, or the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Re-
lief Coordinator, was created in December 1991 and is a high-level UN position that 
heads OCHA – the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.  
4  This is illustrated by the conflicts throughout the 1990s in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, An-
gola, Liberia, DRC, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and Kosovo.  
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In 2002, OCHA devised – at the Council’s request – an Aide Memoire 
to help guide the Council in catering for issues pertaining to protection 
in its ‘deliberations on the establishment, change or close of peace-
keeping mandates’ (UN SC 2001). The memoire was updated in 2003 
(UN OCHA 2004). In addition, the Secretary-General every 18 
months conveys the Security Council a report on PoC, and every six 
months the ERC provides an oral briefing – all of which intend to 
keep the Council informed and abreast of relevant PoC issues as well 
as up to date with the evolving ‘culture of protection’ (UN 2001) as 
there exist no definition of PoC.5 Lack of a definition and the Coun-
cil’s contextual treatment of protection issues have maintained 
‘[…]disagreement as to the extent to which it ought to be binding for 
the international community as a whole, or whether these issues ought 
to be the responsibility of individual member states’ (Vogt, de Car-
valho et al. 2008: 3). Finally, the UNSC adopted the third edition of 
the Aide Memoire updated by UN OCHA on its 6066th meeting on 
January 14, 2009. 
 
There is thus an ambiguity related to the overall protection agenda 
identified in the nexus between the ‘culture of protection’ and the po-
tential need for a stringent PoC definition (Lie and de Carvalho 2008). 
On the one side, the UN system and its military franchise in particular 
operate on strict defined concepts with stipulated thresholds and crite-
ria in order to determine when to apply which instrument from its 
comprehensive toolbox. A clearly defined PoC concept would en-
hance conceptual robustness and make it more binding for UN agen-
cies when situations call for it. On the other hand, however, just as a 
strict definition yields commitment by demarcating when, where, and 
who to respond, it also excludes actors which mandate and core com-
petencies do not fit with the definition. This ambiguity results from 
the institutional formation of PoC within the UN system and the 
Council’s reluctance to agree on any definition as it also perceives 
thresholds and criteria as too binding. Rather, the UN focuses on cre-
ating a ‘culture of protection’ (UN 2001: paragraph 226), a work that 
UN OCHA has taken the lead on.  
 
Building such a culture of protection is not necessarily a second-best 
alternative. First, in enables to diffuse protection issues throughout the 
UN system, and not only to certain designated agencies. Second, it 
recognises that protection concerns are complex matters that necessi-
tate comprehensive solutions including humanitarian and military ac-
tors. Third, it allows for non-UN agencies to be included in protection 
activities under UN-lead, as illustrated by IASC. Fourth, the protec-
                                                 
5  The Secretary General’s reports are UNSG S/1999/957; S/2001/331; S/2002/1300; 
S/2004/431; S/2005/740; and S/2007/643. The ERC has to date delivered thirteen brief-
ings to the UNSC since 1999. The briefings are delivered in June and December each 
year.  
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tion agenda is by and large uncontested and thus enjoys general ad-
herence. The main problem with the culture of protection, however, is 
that it different actors – civilian and military, UN and non-UN agen-
cies – do not have a common defined platform. Rather, what protec-
tion is, what it entails and how to provide for it are interpreted and 
acted upon differently by the various actors. Actors tend to perceive 
protection within their own, separate and respective institutional 
realms, mandates and core competencies. In brief, although a culture 
of protection is more easily disseminated and more inclusive than a 
strict PoC definition, it loses the conceptual clarity a definition yields, 
and becomes open for interpretation with the potential risk of dispa-
rate activities and conceptual dilution. Implementing and streamlining 
PoC are contingent on various UN agencies manage this balancing 
act, and that neither the Security Council nor PoC’s institutional an-
chor OCHA make an either–or decision. Rather it is important that 
PoC is thoroughly understood throughout UN and that various UN 
agencies are supportive to this balancing act.  
 
UN OCHA and the UN in general employ various mechanisms to en-
sure that all UN agencies are abreast of relevant protection issues and 
that protection measures are considered when drafting resolutions, es-
tablishing missions and devising other activities where protection con-
cerns are necessary. Every 18 months the Secretary-General conveys 
to the Security Council a report on PoC, and every six months the 
ERC delivers the Council an oral briefing on issues pertaining to the 
protection of civilians (UN SG 2005). OCHA, moreover, serves as a 
thematic anchor available for other UN agencies, and has produced 
the Aide Memoire (2004; 2009), which is intended as a diagnostic tool 
to assist the Council ‘[…] in ensuring that the protection needs and 
rights of civilians are reflected in relevant resolutions and the man-
dates of peace-keeping operations’ (UN OCHA 2004). The Aide 
Memoire is also designed to be applicable in field situations calling 
for protection measures, and as a tool for systematic analysis and re-
porting.  
 
These practices and measures keep the Council continuously abreast 
to relevant protection issues, have the effect that the protection agenda 
enjoys universal acceptance throughout the UN system, and in sum 
are instrumental in disseminating and upholding a ‘culture of protec-
tion’. This is reflected in the UN’s practical matters, as PoC-
proponents such as UN OCHA, have been largely successful in infus-
ing protection measures into the Council’s deliberations and authorisa-
tion of mandates. A growing number of Security Council mandated 
peace operations, including both civilian and military components, 
included protection language. Since 1999 the phrase ‘protect civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence’ has become an integral 
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part of just about all UN mandated peace operations (Holt 2005).6 The 
mandates given to UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) and INTERFET (Timor-
Leste) in 1999 are important landmarks in the formation of PoC as 
they allow the use of force if necessary to protect civilians. Further-
more, as peace operations during the last decade have grown both in 
number and in terms of broader executive mandates, there has been, as 
Victoria Holt (2005) notes, a clear trend towards including PoC issues 
when deciding upon new peacekeeping operation mandates, as well as 
when revising old ones. This usually comes in the form of the stan-
dard phrase ‘protect civilians under imminent threat of physical vio-
lence’, which usually is accompanied by disclaiming any prejudice to 
the host government’s responsibility to civilian protection. The latter 
point is in line with Deng’s insistence on the necessity of operating 
with host government’s consent, on its invitation (Deng, Kimaro et al. 
1996). 
 
Today, a number of missions have mandates with direct reference to 
protection-language.7 There is, however, an important factor to con-
sider regarding protection-mandates. As Holt asserts, ‘the authorisa-
tion for civilian protection is clear, but the Council’s resolution leaves 
the decision to protect civilians up to the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG), the force commander or another actor fur-
ther down the chain to ‘deem’ it to be within the scope of ‘its capabili-
ties’. What is not clear is if the capabilities, from the beginning, were 
deemed sufficient to protect civilians or were planned to be so’ (Holt 
2005: 14). Of special interest here is the work of L. M. Howard which 
addresses the conventional understanding that UN led peace opera-
tions regularly fail in asserting that the potential success of such op-
erations is contingent on the degree of relative autonomy the mission 
enjoys vis-à-vis headquarters (Howard 2008).8 As UNSC mandates 
make peacekeeping missions’ protection efforts the responsibility of 
the SRSG or others further down the chain one could expect a gener-
ally successful implementation of the protection agenda – as the inter-
pretation of protection mandates happens relatively autonomously 
from headquarters. This is, however, not always the case. One thing, 
as Holt notes, is the uncertainties whether the capabilities to underpin 
the protection agenda from the start are sufficient or intended. Another 
aspect is the contextual interpretation of the protection culture that 
                                                 
6  The only mission since 1999 that does not include this phrase is UNMEE – the United 
Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia.  
7  These operations include ONUB in Burundi, UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire, MONUC in DR 
Congo, MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNMIL in Liberia, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, and 
UNMIS and UNAMID which both are in Sudan. In addition there are a number of other 
UN mandated missions with implications for PoC (see Holt 2005: 49-57). 
8  The degree of autonomy can both be an effect of the respective mission’s intended archi-
tectural design and be an effect of how the SRSG or mission head interpret the mandate, 
her roles and functions, and hollows the space for contextual acts. 
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also risks undermining protection efforts (cf. Lie and de Carvalho 
2008).  
2.1 The Protection of Civilians and the Use of Force 
Although protection language has become increasingly integral to Se-
curity Council deliberations when agreeing upon new mission man-
dates as well as when renewing old ones, the protection language is 
somewhat fuzzy and blurred. ‘To protect civilians under imminent 
threat of physical violence’ is just one example of ambiguous UN jar-
gon that both indicate good intentions and necessary liabilities, while 
simultaneously undermining responsibility and concealing the respon-
sibility and practicalities of how and when protection measures are to 
be applied. The ambiguous protection language recognises the case-
by-case applicability, as it lacks clearly demarcated thresholds and 
criteria for what constitutes a protection situation, and its decentralised 
intent, that the mission head is responsible to deem the when and what 
of protection activities. The language is also an expression of a larger 
dilemma integral to the workings of the UN that concerns the contes-
tation between the tectonic plates of security and humanitarian issues, 
which has been brought to the fore due to the increased security–
development nexus.  
 
While protection issues largely are associated with the humanitarian 
realm, peacekeeping missions are perceived of in the realm of security 
and the military use of force. As PoC is included in mission mandates, 
there is also a potential for conflict as the two separate rationales and 
discourses of security and humanitarianism interface. The humanitar-
ian raison d’être ever since its inception at the first Geneva Conven-
tion is based on abstinence from physical violence and rather relies on 
‘[…]the force of the moral argument, of mutual self-interest, of legal 
codes and of the innate humanitarian impulse occasionally in all peo-
ple’ (Slim 2001). To some it thus raises the concern that ‘the UN is 
now increasingly being mandated to provide physical protection 
through its missions, particularly peacekeeping operations, which 
have been tasked with using military capability in the field either to 
deter attacks on civilians or, sometimes, to use force to defend civil-
ians from attack’ (Security Council Report 2008: 4). The debate on the 
potential use of force for protection purposes evolving as PoC was 
installed in Council deliberations from the late 1990s ‘[…]reflect a 
deeper moral paradox around the use of force. This paradox is the old 
one that the best way to stop violence might be to use it’ (Slim 2001: 
326). The everyday practice of applying and disseminating PoC within 
the UN take place against the backdrop of this paradox, and the ten-
sion between different means available to different actors all involved 
in protecting civilians. 
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3. The Institutional Implementation  
of PoC 
At the UN headquarters in New York, the implementation of the PoC 
agenda has rested largely with UN OCHA, who since the first publica-
tion of the Aide Memoire has become the institutional guardians of the 
measures adopted by the UNSC concerning protecting civilians in 
armed conflict, and largely claim ownership to those ideas. Such a 
situation ensures that the UNSC remains alert to protection issues, es-
pecially after the expert group on protection issues was established in 
January 2009 as a way for UN OCHA protection experts to brief and 
discuss protection issues with the UNSC in relation with peacekeeping 
mandates. However, through interviews with different UN agencies in 
New York it was clear that other UN agencies viewed PoC with a cer-
tain scepticism, as an instrument UN OCHA was using to gain more 
importance and relevance within the UN system. Furthermore, as UN 
OCHA claims ownership to protection issues, the process of further 
institutionalization of PoC system-wide involves a certain degree of 
tension between agencies which often jealously guard their turf and 
ideas. The effect this has on the balancing act between a culture of 
protection and a clearly defined PoC concepts remains, however, an 
empirical question.  
3.1 The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and PoC 
While the policy franchise of PoC is claimed by UN OCHA, UN 
DPKO is charged with the planning, preparation, management and 
direction of UN-led peacekeeping operations. In conventional terms 
the former connotes the humanitarian segment, and the latter to the 
military segment. This distinction is becoming increasingly blurred as 
peacekeeping operations increasingly involve multidimensional and 
integrated efforts at ending conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction. 
The increased attention to PoC throughout UN and its increased in-
scription into missions mandates since the late 1990s have however 
not materialised in any formalised interlocutory system between 
OCHA and DPKO to enhance protection issues. As an illustration, the 
first and only person at DPKO working specifically on protection has 
been there for less than two years, having PoC as mere one amongst 
many designated responsibilities. The protection tasks are limited to 
monitoring what other agencies, internal and external to UN, are doing 
on protection. It is thus neither time nor the role of this person to pro-
actively strengthen DPKO–OCHA ties and to enhance DPKO’s at-
tainment in the protection agenda. The existing DPKO–OCHA protec-
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tion-relations have developed over time, but usually with OCHA in 
the lead. OCHA has pushed for strengthening these links for a long 
time, but were somewhat unsuccessful until member states, notably 
the UK and France, signalled they wanted DPKO to take stronger part 
in the protection agenda. DPKO’s current involvement in PoC is that 
it tries to stay updated on the concept by following discussions and by 
keeping itself abreast with relevant documents and research conducted 
both within and external to UN. 
 
Of special importance here is the ‘Independent Study on the Imple-
mentation of Security Council Mandates on the Protection of Civilians 
in UN Peace Operations, 2008-2009’ which is being conducted by 
Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor and jointly commissioned by UIN 
OCHA and UN DPKO. The study will be made public mid-2009. 
While this study signals more interagency cooperation of poc at head-
quarters, the success of such a report will depend on the extent to 
which the headquarter level will be more attentive the extent to which 
the implementation of poc measures is successful on the ground. In-
deed, the terms of reference of the study state the aim as ‘examining 
how UN peace operations implement their mandates to protect civil-
ians. […] Specifically, the study aims to identify the experiences of 
key actors involved at each stage of the process in which the concept 
of ‘protection of civilians’ evolves through UN mandate language and 
into activities on the ground. The study also aims to identify gaps and 
areas where further action is required and to examine all factors that 
may impact on the ability of missions to effect civilian protection in 
accordance with their mandates.’ 
 
Infringing on the OCHA–DPKO relations is also DPKO’s wish to link 
R2P with PoC. This agenda was pushed for by Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand – all officially pronounced R2P supporters. DPKO’s re-
sponse has so far been positive as long as this would not deter the 
UN’s operational capacity in any way. The OCHA-side, however, are 
highly reluctant to R2P due to its strong militaristic and political con-
notations. To OCHA staff there is a concern of conceptual equation 
between R2P and PoC, while they also understand the proliferation of 
R2P and its reception at DPKO being due to its framing as militaristic 
and interventionist and thus presumably easier to operationalise than 
PoC (cf. Lie 2009).9  
 
Related is the perception among the DPKO that PoC is hard to imple-
ment and thus challenging to include at the level of planning. There is 
a tension between those who provide and promote protection language 
in Council resolutions, notably OCHA and its allies among member 
                                                 
9  However, in May 2008 the Secretary-General gave his first talk on R2P where he at-
tempted to defend and clarify the concept without enshrining it with PoC (UN SG 2008). 
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states, and those who provide troops and manage peacekeeping opera-
tions, i.e. DPKO. HQ officials at both DPKO and OCHA perceive a 
gap in between HQ desk officers, and between desk officers and field 
personnel in terms of how PoC is perceived and implemented. Conse-
quently, they share the need for more guidance on the content and 
practicalities of PoC for both planning and operational staff. As it 
stands now, desk officers in DPKO do not share the understanding of 
PoC which UN OCHA are seeking to promote. Thus, when PoC is-
sues are reported from the field, there are no institutional guarantees 
that this will be reported further up the line once it reaches the desk 
officer in DPKO. 
3.2 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Af-
fairs and PoC 
OCHA staff recognise the difficulties in ‘selling’ PoC to the Security 
Council, DPKO and other UN agencies pertaining to the security 
segment. These problems are illustrated by the decline in OCHA’s 
PoC-activities since 2002. After the inception in the late 1990s the 
PoC-agenda proliferated, but after finalising the first Aide Memoire in 
2002 the overall agenda lost momentum, arguably due to capacity is-
sues and not political reasons.10 Still, the protection language was 
maintained in the Council’s mandates. Although in broad wordings 
without any clear plan of progress, PoC is nevertheless now a well 
anchored concept within the UN system despite its practical meaning 
and implications remain unclear.  
 
OCHA is pursuing a two-pronged approach to enhance PoC. One con-
cerns the active participation of the Security Council, and the other 
aims at operationalising PoC so that the Council, other agencies and 
field personnel know how to apply the protection framework. On the 
former, OCHA’s attempt to enrol one of the P5s to take the lead on 
PoC within the Council has failed. Rather, OCHA has been left with 
either one of the elected Council members as PoC promoter within the 
Council, or by approaching on a case-by-case basis the respective 
member states responsible for drafting resolutions. In effect, OCHA 
so far has lost the necessary continuity within the Council and in its 
deliberations that are vital to uphold the momentum of the general 
protection agenda. In spite of this lack of impetus and continuity, pro-
tection language is included in the Council’s authorisations of new – 
and renewal of old – mission mandates. The inclusion of protection 
                                                 
10  The first Aide Memoire was devised in 2002, and updated in 2003 (UN OCHA 2004). 
Also, the R2P-concept, which evolved since 2001, contributed to PoC loosing momentum 
as many saw this as a more robust and effective way of providing protection and counter-
ing the challenges integral to the protection agenda (ICISS 2001). The debates triggered in 
conjunction to and following the universal endorsement of R2P at the 2005 World Sum-
mit (UN 2005) installed OCHA and the PoC-proponents with new impetus.  
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language, however, is no guarantee for the thorough implementation 
of protection activities at mission level, as the language remains broad 
with few clear propositions, and because it is most often left to the 
mission leadership to interpret this language and translate it into ac-
tion.  
 
OCHA has realized these challenges and sought to mitigate them, 
knowing that operationalising PoC is crucial for its dissemination. To 
the extent that there is a ‘culture of protection’ among HQ agencies, 
this is largely shared among the humanitarian actors. To have actors 
belonging to the security realm onboard, OCHA staff are acutely 
aware that operationalising PoC entails stringent language and defini-
tions although this might undermine the ‘culture of protection’ and 
consequently make the protection agenda less inclusive. There is also 
a concern regarding non-UN agencies: to OCHA, a coherent protec-
tion effort involving non-UN humanitarian agencies is crucial – as il-
lustrated by the IASC, coordinated by OCHA and chaired by the ERC. 
DPKO, however, only rarely involves itself with non-UN agencies. 
Defining PoC to accommodate DPKO and the security segment may 
thus be counter-productive to overall protection activities as some 
non-UN agencies are bound to fall outside of a strict conception of 
PoC. Also, the security segment has formal limitations to the interface 
with non-UN agencies. This dilemma of an inclusive protection cul-
ture versus a more confined definition is also reflected at the mission 
level (Lie and de Carvalho 2008). There is no formal contact between 
missions and HQ agencies on PoC issues that allows for a formal 
learning to happen. Rather, information sharing seems to be confined 
to read field reports on an ad hoc basis by HQ staff. This is a critical 
challenge that needs to be overcome in order to successfully imple-
ment the measures regarding PoC. Since the successful implementa-
tion of these measures largely depends on how they are interpreted in 
the field, how they are adapted to local contexts, and how UN staff 
involved in protection learn from this application of the measures to 
concrete issues, there needs to be a way for these experiences to 
trickle back to HQ, and especially to the UNSC if these experiences 
are to inform the further implementation of the PoC agenda, the meas-
ures the UNSC includes in mandates, and the resources made avail-
able to meet these objectives. 
 
Most of these problems are acknowledge by OCHA, OCHA realises 
there should be more PoC expertise in other UN agencies, but this is 
undermined by the formal and thematic compartmentalisation of UN 
bodies. OCHA thus struggles to maintain the PoC momentum and 
relevance to accommodate the internal challenges of conceptual clar-
ity and interagency coherence, and the external challenges to helping 
civilian casualties of war and conflict. The main modalities for meet-
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ing these challenges are the updating of the Aide Memoire and ensur-
ing that the (finally) newly established expert group to serve the 
Council on protection issues can work as envisioned. 
 
 
 
 
4. Mitigating the Problem of  
Reproducing the Schisms? 
Numerous instruments and practices aim at keeping the UN in general 
and the Security Council in particular abreast to relevant protection 
issues. These include the Secretary-General’s regular reports and the 
ERC’s biannual briefings, which both are conveyed to the Council. 
Security Council resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict, adopted April 28, 2006, is the last thematic resolution 
on PoC (UN SC 2006).11 Although being a PoC resolution, it is usu-
ally referred to as the resolution in which the Council reaffirmed the 
2005 World Summit’s commitment to R2P (see UN 2005: paragraph 
138 and 139). R2P was included in the resolution after much contro-
versy and months of negotiations, and eventually further spurred the 
internal and conceptual challenge to PoC and OCHA (Lie 2008).  
 
As a means to counter the challenges facing PoC and in an attempt to 
regain momentum of the protection agenda, OCHA’s Policy and Stud-
ies Branch proposed two important measures to be implemented in 
2008 (UN OCHA 2008) which were adopted by the UNSC in January 
2009, namely the Council Expert Group on PoC (cf. UN SG 2007), 
and the adoption of the third updated Aide Memoire on Issues Pertain-
ing to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. The working 
group and memoire should be seen together as a two pronged ap-
proach to enhance the Council commitment and involvement in pro-
tection situations.  
                                                 
11  In addition, there are three other thematic PoC resolutions: S/RES/1265 (adopted Novem-
ber 17, 1999), S/RES/1296 (adopted April 19, 2000) and S/RES/1502 (adopted August 
26, 2003). The latter, however, does not directly deal with the conventional civilian pro-
tection as its predecessors, rather it concerns the safety of UN and humanitarian person-
nel, and emerged in the wake of the crisis that followed the killing of 22 UN personnel in 
Baghdad in August 2003, including Sérgio Vieira de Mello (head of OCHA 1998–2001).  
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4.1 The Protection Expert Group 
October 28, 2007 the Secretary-General’s report on the protection of 
civilians recommended that the Council considers establishing a work-
ing group on the protection of civilians, that is,  
 
[…] a dedicated, expert level working group to facilitate the 
systematic and sustained consideration and analysis of protec-
tion concerns, and ensuring consistent application of the aide 
memoire for the consideration of issues pertaining to the pro-
tection of civilians in Council deliberations on the mandates of 
United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions, 
draft resolutions and presidential statements, and in Council 
missions (UN SG 2007: paragraph 66m).  
 
In November 2007, the Secretary-General reiterated this recommenda-
tion, as a matter of priority, that the Security Council establishes a 
Council working group to facilitate enhanced consideration and analy-
sis of protection issues (UN SG 2007). This call came as in recogni-
tion to the ‘dreadful toll’ civilians continue to pay in armed conflicts 
around the world. The working group was to be dedicated to improv-
ing protection for civilians in such situations and to ensure that protec-
tion issues were at heart to all Council deliberations requiring it. The 
Secretary-General stated:  
 
 I believe the establishment of such a group is an important 
next step, perhaps even an inevitable next step, in the evolution 
of the Council’s consideration of the protection of civilians. It 
would not only underline the Council’s commitment to this 
cause, it would give practical meaning to your commitment. It 
would ensure more timely and systematic consideration of the 
protection of civilians in the Council’s deliberations. And it 
would assist the Council to move decisively towards practical 
implementation (UN SG 2007).  
 
Following this, establishing a Council working group became part of 
OCHA’s planned 2008-activities. The group was intended as a the-
matic anchor to support the Council and member states when drafting 
resolutions and mandates comprising protection issues, develop re-
sponse capabilities and other practical measures to safeguard civilians. 
The working group shall provide the Council with accurate and timely 
information, provide the best analysis of protection aspects enabling 
the Council to make wise decisions when establishing and renewing 
mandates for peacekeeping operations.  
 
The working group took long to materialise. On November 16, 2007, 
the Security Council Report (Security Council Report 2007) – in a 
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forecast report on expected Council actions – asserted it ‘unclear 
whether members will want to adopt a formal outcome from the de-
bate[…] It is unclear whether there will be appetite for a new Council 
working group on protection of civilians’. Reasons given were that 
several member states were not able or ready to take on ‘[…] large 
load of work at the abstract level without some sort of rationing 
mechanism that clarified and defined the issues to be covered and 
without some sort of country-specific focus’ (ibid.). By May 2008, it 
was reported that ‘[…]the idea of setting up formally a new working 
group on the protection of civilians appears unlikely’ (Security Coun-
cil Report 2008) due to fear up duplicating already existing work and 
thus adding another bureaucratic layer and mechanism to the Coun-
cil’s already extensive practices.  
 
Apart from OCHA, the process of establishing the working group was 
driven by the French, although, among member states, it is the UK 
who claims ownership to PoC. The expert group was long vetoed by 
the three other P5s as they were afraid it would add to the bureaucracy 
of the Council. 
 
It seems that a working group was a bridge too far for the Council to 
agree upon as it abandoned the idea settled for a more informal expert 
group. Interviewees stated it was the denotation as working group that 
triggered reluctance by Council members, as it implied another layer 
added to the Council. Rather it opted for an expert group. An informal 
expert group would yield less bureaucracy for the Council and rather 
enhance more flexible working methods. This expert group will re-
ceive regular updates on humanitarian and protection issues from the 
field, mission level and from OCHA’s thematic work in order to ad-
vice the Council when establishing and renewing peacekeeping mis-
sions’ mandates, and ensure that protection language become integral 
to all relevant Council resolutions.  
 
The notion of a working group is, however, not new, and its intricate 
trajectory illustrates the Council’s reluctance in committing to PoC. 
The expert group was first time proposed by the Secretary-General in 
1998 but was also then refused by the Council (Security Council Re-
port 2008: 9). In the landmark report of 1999, (UN SC 1999) where 
the content of PoC was carved out, the Secretary-General proposed a 
working group to be integral to PoC to safeguard continuous protec-
tion concerns, but this was shied away by the Council when deciding 
upon the content of PoC.12 
                                                 
12  Other proposals to enhance PoC have also been rejected. The proposal to compile the 
provisions of PoC-resolutions 1265 and 1296 into a roadmap indicating the responsibili-
ties of various UN organs never saw any formal Council reaction. Efforts by Norway and 
other member states to establish a PoC support group, never materialised. In 2003, ERC 
Jan Egeland – in sensing the Council’s decreased momentum in PoC – proposed ten ac-
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4.2 Updating the Aide Memoire 
Until January 2009, The Aide Memoire had not been updated since 
2004. The 2004 Aide Memoire was intended as a diagnostic tool to 
assist the Council ‘in ensuring that the protection needs and rights of 
civilians are reflected in relevant resolutions and the mandates of 
peace-keeping operations’ (UN OCHA 2004). The memoire was also 
designed to be applicable to field situations; as a tool for systematic 
analysis and reporting. The document listed issues pertaining to the 
protection of civilians to facilitate the Council’s due consideration of 
them whenever appropriate. The Aide Memoire listed 17 primary ob-
jectives and 58 issues, grouped under 13 broad headings,13 for the 
Council’s contemplation when devising mission mandates. Due to its 
wide scope and the plethora of issues for considerations, document 
has not been as effective and influential as expected. Member states 
and UN HQ staff external to OCHA see the document as somewhat 
irrelevant when drafting resolution. The typical response among man-
date drafters on the applicability, use and importance of the memoire 
is ‘none’.  
 
At mission level, confusion prevails among and between humanitarian 
and peacekeeping personnel concerning how to relate to the Aide 
Memoire. While the former group largely embodies a culture of pro-
tection and thus is reluctant to recalibrate their notion of it, the latter 
lacks a clear conception of protection to install it in operational activi-
ties. The new and revised Aide Memoire intends to counter these prob-
lems,14 but the problems associated with having a broad all-
encompassing concept are likely to remain as the new memoire ver-
sion is just as comprehensive and wide in scope as earlier versions.  
 
The updated Aide Memoire lists 49 issues under three main headings, 
namely ‘General Protection Concerns Pertaining to the Conflict-
Affected Population, ‘Specific Protection Concerns Arising from Se-
curity Council Discussions on Children Affected by Armed Conflict’, 
and ‘Specific Protection Concerns Arising from Security Council Dis-
cussions on Women Affected by Armed Conflict’. The first of these 
                                                 
tion points drawn from the failed roadmap to strengthen PoC, to which the Council’s re-
sponse was limited to note ‘with interest’ without any promises of formal reaction (Secu-
rity Council Report 2008: 7–11). 
13  The headings are Security for displaced persons and host communities; Access to vulner-
able populations; Safety and security of humanitarian and associated personnel; Security 
and the rule of law; Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation; Small 
arms and mine action; Effects on and contribution of women; Effects on children; Justice 
and reconciliation; Training of security and peacekeeping forces; Media and information; 
natural resources and armed conflict; and Humanitarian Impact of sanctions.  
14  Revising the Aide Memoire is part of OCHA’s 2008 activities. An informant stated it was 
supposed to be finalised in mid-august 2008, but was postponed due to the conflict in 
Georgia. In resuming the work with the new Aide Memoire, OCHA’s Protection of Civil-
ians Section embarked on the process of bilateral consultation with Council member 
states to discuss the content of the updated document, following discussions among the 
membership before it was to be brought before the Council. 
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headings is divided under ‘Protection of, and assistance to the con-
flict-affected population’, ‘Displacement’, ‘Humanitarian access and 
safety and security of humanitarian workers’, ‘Conduct of hostilities’, 
‘Small arms and light weapons, mines and explosive remnants of 
war’, ‘Compliance, accountability and the rule of law’, and ‘Media 
and information’.  
 
The expert group discussion and the Aide Memoire revision signal not 
only the need to constantly update the PoC framework both in light of 
new UNSC resolutions and in terms of experiences with PoC in the 
field, but also that the protection realm has gained new momentum 
that brings it closer to the heart of Council and member states delib-
erations. Still, the intricate trajectory of PoC seems to sustain. The 
working-vs.-expert group controversy demonstrate the Council’s con-
tinuous indignation and lack of a formal and binding commitment to 
PoC, which makes the overall balancing act of driving PoC issues 
forward a difficult task for UN OCHA.  
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Although PoC today is largely embedded in the UN system as a 
whole, there are a number of issues still critical to address at the insti-
tutional level for the PoC to inform a shared culture of protection ef-
fectively. These include addressing the extent to which preparations 
for civilian protection are an integral component of mission planning, 
and whether protection activities are part of the mission’s mandate per 
se or mere part of its many tasks. Also of key concern is the extent to 
which operational capacity is achieved and designed to enhance pro-
tection.  
 
Another issue of concern relates to how to cater for different notions 
of impartiality and neutrality between humanitarian efforts and peace 
operations – being indicative to the protection paradox. As Holt as-
serts, while ‘humanitarian staff may neutrally provide food to all 
members of a needy population, regardless of their previous actions 
[…] military forces within a peace operation will forgo neutrality to 
uphold their mandate, however, yet still be impartial in its actions, in-
cluding use of force, against spoilers who act outside of a political 
agreement of undermine security’ (Holt 2005: 12).  
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Finally, at headquarter level, two main challenges remain. How can 
PoC become part of a shared interagency culture, rather than remain-
ing the sole prerogative or task of UN OCHA without thereby losing 
its institutional momentum, and how can UN DPKO take greater own-
ership to PoC without this being prejudicial to the ability of the con-
cept to include both military and humanitarian segments of peace op-
erations. Finally, as the effective protection of civilians in mission de-
pends not only on the UNSC’s ability to adopt new measures aimed at 
protecting civilians, but also on the extent to which these measures are 
effective in protecting vulnerable groups on the ground, there needs to 
be clearer institutional mechanisms for learning from experience. As 
of today, the reporting from the field is largely lost to those drafting 
resolutions.  
 
The update of the Aide Memoire to include and reflect changes in the 
PoC on the basis of UNSC resolution is only one step in the right di-
rection. The expert working group can be another step. However, the 
ability of UN missions to protect civilians in peacekeeping operations 
will only become fully effective once the UN system manages to set in 
place institutional structures for learning on the basis of the experi-
ences on the ground, and cooperate on PoC on a case-to-case basis.
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